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(CONSTITUTIONAL) LAW (Günter Frankenberg ed., Elgar, 2013)  
Law reformers like the World Bank sometimes suggest that optimal legal rules and 
institutions can be recognized and then be recommended for law reform in every 
country in the world. Comparative lawyers have long been skeptical of such views. 
They point out that both laws and social problems are context-specific. What works in 
one context may fail in another. Instead of “one size fits all,” they suggest tailormade 
solutions. 
I challenge this view. Drawing on a comparison with IKEA’s global marketing strategy, 
I suggest that “one size fits all” can sometimes be not only a successful law reform 
strategy, but also not as objectionable as critics make it to be. First, whereas, “one size 
fits all” is deficient a functionalist position, it proves to be surprisingly successful as a 
formalist conception. Second, critics of legal transplants often insistson what can be 
called “best law” approach, whereas in law reform, what we sometimes need is law 
that is just” good enough” law. “Third, legal transplants no longer happen in isolation 
but rather on a global scale, so that context-specific rules are no longer necessarily 
local. 
This is not a plea for formal law, for commodification of laws, and for “one size fits all”. 
But it is a plea to overcome the romanticism and elitism that may lurk behind the 
seemingly benign suggestion that law reform must always be tailored to the specific 
societal context. 
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I. Introduction 
The World Bank likes global solutions. In the first of its annual “Doing Business” 
reports, it suggested that, in law reform, “one size can fit all—in the manner of 
business regulation”.1 What the Bank means is that best practices can be identified 
that would improve the legal system of every country, regardless  of its legal and 
general culture, economic system, level of development, etc.2 This idea—that what 
matters is the quality of a legal institution law determined in the abstract, not its 
fit— is widespread for business law reform, but not confined to this area. Recent 
studies on transfer of constitutional norms show similar developments. David Law 
and Mila Versteeg mention “generic rights” that exist in virtually all constitutional 
texts.3 
This idea of “one size fits all” is a provocation for comparative lawyers.4 The 
presumption that the success of legal transplants is independent of the conditions of 
the recipient countries runs against longstanding convictions in comparative law.  
Some of these convictions are empirical and theoretical: the inadequacy of viewing 
laws as mere words (law in action versus law in the books); the interplay between 
different legal rules within one legal system, the groundedness of all law in local 
legal culture. Others are ideological: an opposition against legal hegemonialism 
through western laws and concepts, against a western preference for formal rules 
over substantive justice. 
                                                        
1  IFC/World Bank, Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation (2004) xvi. 
2 The report does suggest that underdeveloped countries should adopt simpler 
versions. See id. xvi, xvii. 
3  David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, ‘The Evolution and Ideology of Global 
Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 California Law Review 1163, 1199-2002. 
4 For critique, see, especially, Kevin E. Davis, Legal Universalism: Persistent 
Objections,  University of Toronto LJ 60 (2010) 537. A summary of French reactions, 
see Anne-Julie Kerhuel & Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Is Law and Economic 
Contest? French Reactions to the Doing Business World Bank Reports and Economic 
Analysis of Law, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 811 (2009). The World Bank, in face of this 
pressure, later dropped the “one size fits all” idea.  
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In fact, amongst comparative lawyers, “one size fits all” has long been used as an 
ironic depiction of unsophisticated attempts of law reform that is to be rejected.5 
Another metaphor, similarly scathing, is “cut and paste”6 – the (critical) observation 
that legal reformers merely copy textual bits and pieces from one constitution to 
another, with little regard to context. But the critique of comparatists has long been, 
to some extent,  a matter of faith more than experience. We observe that universal 
solutions are in fact sought more and more—whether they fit or not. And if we took 
the “cut and paste” metaphor seriously, we would have to admit that it is not 
incompatible with context-specificity. When you choose “paste” in your word 
processing program, it will likely give you three options: “Keep source formatting; 
match destination formatting; keep text only.” Transposed to legal transplants, we 
can not only try to implement rules in the same fashion in which they exist in the 
source country—which will likely yield strange results. We can also yield to the 
demands of comparatists and adapt the rule to the “formatting” of the destination 
country, so it will match indistinguishably. And, most mysteriously perhaps, we can 
also transfer rules as “text only” –and then they will, like a chameleon, suddenly 
become compatible with any new surrounding. How can we explain that? 
We need a more sophisticated account,  and here, Günter Frankenberg’s recent work 
can help. Frankenberg takes the idea of “one size fits all” more seriously and 
develops a whole “IKEA theory of legal transplants” around it—though one that he 
views critically. 7 For Frankenberg, transplants do not take place directly between 
domestic systems; they are mediated through a global constitution. But that global 
                                                        
5 E.g. Randall Peerenbaum, Toward a Methodology for Successful Legal Transplants 
(2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1981887. But see also    Verheul, Cos  fan tutte, 
in and Evaluation: Essays on Comparative Law, Private International Law and 
International Commercial Arbitration in Honour of D. Kokkini-Iatridou, еd. By K. 
Boele-Woelki (Dordrecht ; Boston : M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1994). 
6 Richard Zajac Sannerholm, ‘Cut-and-paste’?  Rule of  law promotion and legal 
transplants in war to peace transitions, in Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt & 
Joakim Bergelius (eds), New Directions in Comparative Law (___) 56; Michal Gal, The 
“Cut and  aste” of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Conditions for a  Successful 
Transplant, 9(3) European Journal of Law Reform 467, (2007); Holger Spamann, 
Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) 
Law, 2009 Brigham Young  Law Review 1813, 1840, citing Kenneth L. Karst & Keith 
Rosenn, Law and Development in Latin America: A Case Book 67 (1975). 
7 Günter Frankenberg, ‘Constitutional transfer: The IKEA theory revisited’ (2010) 8 
Journal of International Constitutional Law 563; see already Günter Frankenberg, 
Autorit t und Integration.  ur  rammatik von  echt und  erfassung (2003) 124–132; 
Günter Frankenberg, ‘Constitutions in Transfer—Territoriality and Extra-
territoriality’ in Gunther Handl,  oachim Zekoll,  eer Zumbansen (eds), Beyond 
Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization (Brill, 2012) 
261, 278-83. 
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constitution is not a real one.  Instead, it is “a supermarket, where standardized 
constitutional items—grand designs as well as elementary particles of 
information—are stored and available, pr t- -porter, for purchase and 
reassemblage by constitution makers around the world.”8 
I sympathize with the comparatists’ reservations against the one size fits all idea. 
How could I not? But I think the critique is not only exaggerated but actually, in part, 
misdirected. This is so for several reasons. A first reason is that critics like 
proponents conflate a formalist and a functionalist understanding of law. However, 
whereas, “one size fits all” is deficient a functionalist position, it proves to be 
surprisingly successful as a formalist conception. A second reason is that the 
critique of legal transplants often insists on what can be called “best law” approach, 
whereas in law reform, what we sometimes need is law that is just good enough. 
“One size fits all” will not create the best law, but it can sometimes create law that is 
good enough in situations in which a best law is not available. Just like IKEA brings 
affordable design into households that cannot afford tailor-fit furniture, so a one-
size-fits-all approach to law reform may create good-enough legal solutions that are 
at least as adequate for globalization as would be purely local rules.  A third reason 
is that legal transplants no longer happen in isolation but rather on a global scale, a 
process that encourages formalization and standardization. Context-specific rules 
make sense as local rules only as long as the context remains local. Under conditions 
of globalizations, such locality becomes questionable.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, I recapitulate Frankenberg’s Ikea theory 
of legal transplants. In section III, I put this theory into context by juxtaposing it 
with three theories of transplant—instrumentalism, culturalism, and formalism—
and demonstrate that formalism, not functionalism, is most in accordance with it. In 
sections IV and V I expand on the idea of an IKEA theory by comparing in more 
depth Ikea’s success in the consumer market with the success of legal transplants. 
First, in section IV, I discuss standardization and economies of scale as factors of 
success. In section V, I look at globalization as an underestimated element in 
transfer analyses. A short conclusion follows. 
II. The Ikea Theory of Legal Transplants 
It should be clear from the beginning: “One size fits all” is not just an innocently 
naïve view of law reform and of legal transplants. Behind the idea lie both a certain 
concept of law and a certain ideology of law reform. Most analysts view transplants 
as a two-stage process: a rule is taken from law A, and implemented in law B. 
Frankenberg, by contrast, helpfully unearths the implications involved in the one 
                                                        
8 Frankenberg, ‘IKEA Theory revisited’ (n ) at 565. 
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size fits all approach as a multistage process that he borrows from Edward Said.9 
Instead of summarizing the theory, I want to represent it here both graphically and 
in a consecution of steps slightly different from the one Frankenberg draws himself. 
  
                                                        
9 Frankenberg, IKEA Theory revisited (n ) at 570-76. For Said’s own theory, see 

















In its original version, the Ikea theory includes four steps, but I find it more 
instructive to recreate the theory as a five-stage process. In the first stage, a legal 
rule is found in the specific context of a legal system and its underlying legal and 
political culture. The transfer from stage (1) to stage (2) represents a 
decontextualization of the rule. This includes three elements: rules are “reified as 
marketable commodities, then formalized, that is, stripped of their contextual 
meanings, and, finally, idealized as meaning what they are meant to mean and 
functioning in the way they are meant to function.”10 Here, the rule is still 
understood as belonging to legal system A, but this belonging is merely formal—the 
rule has no context-specific meaning,. It can be called an empty rule.11 
The step from stage 2 to 3 captures the transfer from the local to the global 
reservoir. Frankenberg, quite ingeniously, realizes that rules are rarely transferred 
directly from one system to another. Where they are identified as “best practices,” 
they are no longer viewed as properly belonging to a legal system; they are part of 
“a reservoir or, for that matter, a supermarket, where standardized constitutional 
                                                        
10 Id. at 571. 
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items—grand designs as well as elementary particles of information—are stored 
and available, prêt-à-porter, for purchase and reassemblage by constitution 
makers around the world.”12 As such a rule belongs to no legal system, the legal 
rule can be transferred back into a different legal system B – the move from stage 
3 to stage 4. Like in stage 2, the rule may look as though it belongs to a legal 
system, but it is a mere empty rule without any contextual meaning. In fact, except 
for the formal integration into a new legal system, the legal rule looks no different 
in stage 4  than it did in stage 2 (or 3): its commodification enables it to travel.  
Context-specific meaning is added in the contextualization which leads from stage 
4 to 5. This last step, Frankenberg suggests, presents far greater risks than are 
usually acknowledged: rules may require complicated adaptations, 
reinterpretations, bricolage, and parts may be missing to make such adaptation 
possible. The recontextualization may or may not be successful. The rule may be 
met with resistance. It may be a bad fit for the new system. And it may face what 
Frankenberg, invoking his Ikea metaphor again, calls “the risk of ‘missing links’—
institutional parts, doctrinal screws, ideological hooks, and the like.” 13 
Recontextualization thus creates technical problems that are underplayed by law 
reformers. But recontextualization also creates ideological concerns. The foreign 
rule may function as an irritant, to use Gunther Teubner’s term;14 it may put 
considerable pressure on the recipient legal system. Such irritation can sometimes 
be desirable, as Wilhelmsson has argued with regard to pressures from EU law on 
domestic la.15 Even then, this is where the threat of hegemonialism and imperialism 
becomes most virulent. 
There are, thus, three different critiques involved in the Ikea theory. The first of 
these, the one most familiar from the general literature, concerns 
recontextualization – the step from stage 4 to 5. Here, Frankenberg does not add 
much to what we already know in theory (though we do not always pay enough 
attention to it in practice)—the fact that law reformers are often insensitive to the 
actual requirements in the recipient country. A second critique is less common, 
though it exists in the literature, too. 16  This is the critique concerning 
                                                        
12 Id. at 565. 
13 Id. at 575. 
14 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law 
Ends Up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11, 12. 
15 E.g. Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘ rivate Law in the EU: Harmonised or Fragmented 
Europeanisation?’ (2002) 1 European Review of Private Law 77, 91-93; cf. Ralf 
Michaels, ‘Why we have no theory of European private law pluralism’ in Leone 
Niglia (ed. ), Pluralism and European Private Law (Hart. 2013)  139, 154. 
16 It has been made by Frankenberg before, too. In an early text, he already laid the 
foundation for his critique of the Ikea approach to transplants: 
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decontextualization, the step from stage 1 to 2. Here, Frankenberg draws on 
Legrand’s critique against Watson’s theory of legal transplants, in particular the 
distinction between laws as text versus laws as propositional statements. The third 
critique is, I think, the most novel and the most illuminating. It concerns the steps 
between stages 2, 3, and 4, where a rule travels freely between (different) local 
levels and a global level. This travel is made possible by the commodification of the 
legal rule—treating it as a commodity that can be bought and sold in a global public 
market for laws.17 Here, Frankenberg’s critique is not merely practical, as that of 
many other opponents to legal transplants. Rather, it goes directly against the 
capitalist ideology underlying the “one size fits all” approach. 
III. Instrumentalist, Culturalist and Formali Transplants 
Frankenberg’s critique of decontextualization as a step in the transplant process 
finds some inspiration in the so-called Watson-Legrand debate on legal 
transplants.18 This provides a helpful framework for discussions of legal transplants, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
How solutions can be ‘cut loose’ from their context and at the same time be 
related to their environment , how law can be ‘seen purely’ as function 
satisfying a ‘partucular’ need escapes me. It seems to require two 
contradictory operations: first, suppressing the context and considering it; 
and then moving from the general (function) to the specific without knowing 
what makes the specific specific. The functionalist negates the interaction 
between legal institutions and provisions by stripping them from their 
systemic context and integrating them in an artificial universal typology of 
"solutions." In this way, "function" is reified as a principle of reality and not 
taken as an analytical principle that orders the real world. It becomes the 
magic carpet that shuttles us between the abstract and the concrete, that 
transcends the boundaries of national legal concepts, that builds the system 
of comparative law, the "universal" comparative legal science or "the general 
law.  
Günter Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, (1985) 
26 Harvard Journal of International Law 411, 440 (internal citation omitted). 
17 Ralf Michaels, ‘Make or Buy—A  ublic Market for Legal Transplants?’ in Horst 
Eidenmüller (ed.), Regulatory Competition in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution 
(Hart, 2013). 
18 Frankenberg (n ___ above) 565-70. Alan Watson first presented his thesis in his 
Legal Transplants (1974), and in numerous iterations since.  ierre Legrand’s reply 
is entitled ‘The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’ 4 Maastricht Journal of European 
and 111-124 (1997); republished without significant changes as Pierre Legrand, 
‘What “Legal Transplants”?’ in Adapting Legal Cultures 68 (David Nelken & Johannes 
Feest eds., Hart, 2001).  Alan Watson responded to Legrand in his Ius Commune 
Lecture: ‘Legal Transpants and European  rivate Law’ Electronic  ournal of 
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but I worry that the discussion is inexact in one important aspect. Frankenberg, like 
Legrand and many others before him, criticizes Watson for both formalism and 
functionalism; he suggests, in fact, that functionalists should agree with Watson.19 
But such an equation of formalism and functionalism, although not infrequent,20 is 
problematic. When functionalism was developed as an approach to law, this 
happened in explicit opposition to formalism.21 The critique against formalism is 
that it does not care about consequences, whereas the critique against functionalism 
is that it cares only about consequences. An approach that tries to be both 
functionalist and formalist would thus be internally contradictory. I therefore 
discuss first functionalism (and within it the variant most at play in the one size fits 
all approach, namely instrumentalism), then the culturalist critique, and only at the 
end formalism.  
a) The Instrumentalist failure 
Although both Legrand and Frankenberg direct their critique against Alan Watson’s 
position, I think the main culprit, in their view, are law reform institutions like the 
World Bank and scholars like La Porta et al, who develop single best solutions for 
the problems of each society.22 Such law reformers have an instrumentalist 
understanding of law; they view laws as means towards an end. Their approach has 
three elements. First, “law matters”: law has predictable consequences on society. 
Second, those effects are, in principle, the same in any society. Third, based on this 
knowledge, law reformers can pick the best laws in order to bring such 
consequences about. 
Note that, among the three elements of this approach, the first and the last are less 
controversial than the second. The first element, namely that law has an impact on 
society, can hardly be denied in general (though Alan Watson does deny it, at least 
for private law). The third, namely that law reformers can pick the best laws in 
order to bring about the best consequences, is more contentions, but still widely 
supported. Without this assumption, law reform would be futile. It is the second 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Comparative Law, 4.4 Electric Journal of Comparative Law (Dec. 2000), at 
http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html. 
19 Frankenberg (n ___ above) 569. 
20  Kerry Rittich, ‘Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in 
Contemporary Development and Governance Debates’ (2005) 55 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 853 (2005);  eer Zumbansen, ‘Law after the Welfare State: 
Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law’ (2008) 56 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 769-805; also in Beyond the State—Rethinking Private 
Law (Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels eds, Mohr Siebeck 2008) 349. 
21 Felix S. Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 35 
Columbia Law Review 809.  
22 Rafael La  orta et al, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ 46 Journal of 
Economic Literature 285 (2008). 
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step—the idea that laws yield the same outcomes anywyere, and that therefore one 
solution is the best for any society, that is the most problematic. 
This is a kind of legal functionalism, even if that is not always said openly.23 But it is 
a very peculiar kind of functionalism. First, in insisting that one solution fits the 
problems found in every legal situation, it ignores one core element of functionalism 
in comparative law, namely functional equivalence—the insight that, in different 
systems, different legal solutions may respond to similar problems.24 Second, in 
viewing law as a tool, it represents a specific kind of functionalims, namely 
instrumentalism25 Functionalism takes an observer’s perspective on the relation 
between institutions and societal needs; it incorporates also unrealized needs and 
unrealized (“latent”) functions. Instrumentalism, by contrast, adopts a participant’s 
need: here, the societal need is necessarily known, and a legal rule is aimed at 
responding to this need—whether successfully, or not. Third, although 
instrumentalism could develop different solutions for different societies, the one-
size-fits-all approach, in proposing one solution for every society, must deny the 
relevance of context, or of the specific character of the legal problem to respond to. 
This is sometimes called the law of the hammer (“If all you have is a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail”).26 
b) The culturalist critique 
Such a functionalist and instrumentalist understanding of law for legal transplants 
has often been criticized by comparative lawyers.27 The most radical critique of 
transplants has been voiced by Pierre Legrand. In opposition to both functionalism 
and instrumentalism, Legrand represents what can be called a culturalist approach 
to legal transplants.28 He suggests that legal transplants are both impossible and 
undesirable. His main argument is that rules are inseparably connected with their 
local/national culture and society and thus cannot be taken out of one society and 
                                                        
23 Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functionalism of Legal Origins’ in  Does Law Matter? On Law 
and Economic Growth (100 Ius Commune Europaeum, Michael Faure & Jan Smits eds, 
Intersentia, 2011) 21. 
24 Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
Oxford University Press, pb. ed. 2008) 339, 376-78. 
25 See id. at 351. 
26 Cf. Abraham Kaplan The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science 
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co. 1964) 28-29 (“the law of the instrument”); 
cf. Abraham H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science (1966) 15. 
27 For a collection of such arguments, see Ralf Michaels, ‘Comparative Law By 
Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of 
Traditional Comparative Law’ (2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 765. 
28 References above n ___. 
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transplanted to another without losing, or changing, their meaning. Moreover, 
Legrand argues, transplants need to be rejected vigorously because they threaten 
the integrity of legal cultures.  
Legrand’s thesis is sometimes viewed as exaggerated but generally sound, at least 
among comparative lawyers. And indeed, Legrand’s suggestion that law is cultural 
fits well our desire in comparative law to focus on law in action rather than in the 
books, and to see law in context. We know (or we think we know) that legal rules 
alone do not do much work, that the real life of the law is in its interaction with 
society and culture. 
We should note, however, a certain inconsistency between the two critiques. Recall 
that Legrand voices two arguments against the transplant theory: first, they are 
impossible (thus the title of his article); second, they are to be rejected because they 
lead to undesirable outcomes. Actually, these two arguments are inconsistent:.29 
something cannot be without and effect and harmful at the same time. Either legal 
cultures are robust, then transplants are impossible. Or, legal transplants do change 
cultures, then they cannot be impossible. 
This suggests two weaknesses in the culturalist critique of legal transplants. The 
first concerns the object of critique, in particular the conflation of functionalist and 
formalist conceptions. One part of Legrand’s critique is directed against a formalist 
understanding of legal rules as mere propositional statement, which, precisely 
because they have no meaning, have no impact on society. Another part of his 
critique, by contrast, is directed against an instrumentalist understanding, which is 
aimed at having an impact on society. 
The other weakness is the underlying assumption of legal cultures as relatively 
isolated entities. In reality, we can see that legal rules often receive their meaning, in 
part, from inspiration by foreign legal systems. This is so not only where 
comparative law is used explicitly—a strategy that culturalists see with justifiable 
suspicion.30  It is also true where societies have forgotten that they once borrowed 
both an institution and its underlying rationale. One example is the concept of 
“militant democracy”—developed by Loewenstein after his emigration in the US 
context, and later imported into Germany.31 
c) The Formalist Challenge 
Now, insofar as the culturalist critique is directed against instrumentalism, it does 
not apply to Watson’s thesis. Watson’s thesis is not that laws are transplanted as 
                                                        
29 As has been noted by Annelise Riles, ‘Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies’ in 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (n ___ above) 775, ___ n ___. 
30  ierre Legrand, ‘Comparative Legal Studies and the Matter of Authenticity’ (2006) 
1 Journal of Comparative Law 365, 404-25. 
31 See also The “Militant Democracy” Principle in Modern Democracies (Markus Thiel 
ed, Ashgate 2009). 
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instruments to improve society. Rather, he suggests that a connection with society is 
irrelevant. Laws are transplanted all the time; over centuries and between vastly 
different societies. Chinese, Ecuadorian and French rules on minute details of 
contract law are almost verbatim, despite the great differences between societies. 
It is usually overlooked that Watson—in that sense in perfect agreement with 
Legrand—is explicitly antifunctionalist and antiinstrumentalist. He suggests, 
repeatedly, that legal transplants do not matter. This is so because, in his view, 
law—at least private law—does not matter. To go back to the Ikea theory, because 
Watson denies any  relevance of context for legal rules, he would deny that stage 1 
plays any role—and, consequently, also that stage 5 could play any role.  His focus is 
only on the transitions between stages 2 and 4. Legrand, by contrast, focuses only on 
a direct transition from stage 1 to stage 5 and thus, because he ignores stages 2 to 4, 
considers transplants impossible. Neither of them offers a meaningful concept of 
translation. 
This seems, at first, an uninteresting theory. Watson has little to offer, it appears, 
beyond the observation that rules as mere propositional statements are borrowed 
and transferred all the time. His suggestion that legal rules are detached from 
society seems extreme, even if (as Bill Ewald suggests)32 it is an implication and not 
a precondition of his views on transplants, leaves us only with a negative but not 
independent theory of law. And his project – to look at texts of rules that regardless 
of their purpose or impact – seems, intellectually and asthetically, deeply 
unattractive. 
The theory gets more exciting, however, if we view it in light of the IKEA theory. 
After neither functionalism nor formalism can explain the “empty rule” element of 
that theory, it seems Watson’s formalism seems most compatible with both theory 
in form of the IKEA theory and with experience. When laws are transferred, they are 
transferred as mere forms, largely devoid of meaning. They receive their meaning in 
the local context, but they retain their denationalized, abstract character. They do 
represent “propositional statements,” but, amazingly, as such they suddenly 
transcend national contexts and therefore are able to travel. 
This phenomenon is looked down upon in traditional legal scholarship, which has 
become profoundly antiformalist. But such disdain for form is not shared in other 
disciplines, especially (legal) anthropology. Marilyn Strathern has suggested the 
constraint of form as a valid object of ethnographic analysis.33 is known from 
anthropology, in particular from science and technology studies. Bruno Latour has 
suggested that standardized forms make it possible, effectively, to travel far without 
leaving home: the form is capable of traveling and of referencing its origin, without 
                                                        
32 William Ewald, ‘Comparative  urisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ 
(2005) 43 American Journal of Comparative Law 489, 502-3. 
33 Marilyn Strathern, The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with 
Society in Melanesia (University of California Press, 1988) 180-82. 
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the need to carry meaning with it.34 Annelise Riles has applied such insights to legal 
anthropology. In her ethnology of financial markets, she finds that forms and 
documents are what is transplanted and what keeps global law together—complex 
legal documents with no relevance other than its symbolic role.35 
Indeed, it seems fruitful to view the empty rules that travel so easily, detached from 
any contextual meaning, less as propositional statements, and more as artifacts. 36 
Fuchs praises artifacts for much the same things that legal transplants are supposed 
to accomplish: they “‘make little room for skepticism, especially when they 
generate rather predictable uniform outcomes across a variety of settings, 
occasions, times or operating personnel’.37 It is their character as artifacts that 
enables rules to travel. And it is that character that enables their commodification, 
too. 
IV. Ikea revisited 1: Economies of Scale in Law Reform 
This may explain how one size fits all, and the IKEA theory, presuppose the 
possibility of a purely formal understanding of legal rules, of rules as artefacts. But 
how can “one size fits all” work? It is worth going back to Frankenberg’s Ikea 
metaphor and expanding on it, maybe taking it more seriously even than its creator. 
I want to look at what makes IKEA so successful in the marketplace, and what we 
can learn from this for legal transplants. I do this in first steps—first by focusing on 
local consequences, then on global ones.  
a) Standardization and Adaptation as Complementary Strategies 
When companies go global (as Ikea has), they have, it is often said, two alternative 
possible strategies.38 One is adaptation to local contexts—the willingness to sell, in 
                                                        
34 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society (Harvard University Press, 1987); see also, e.g., Stefan Timmermans & Marc 
Berg, ‘Standardization in Action: Achieving Local Universality through Medical 
 rotocols’ (1987) Social Studies of Science 273. 
35 Annelise Riles, ‘The Anti-Network—Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, 
and the Legitimacy of the State’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 605, 
and in Beyond the State (above n ___) 183. 
36 Annelise Riles (ed.), Documents—Artifacts of Modern Knowledge (2006). 
37 Stephan Fuchs, Against Essentialism: A Theory of Culture and Society (2001) 306. 
38 John K Ryans jr, David A Griffith, D Steven White, ‘Standardizations/adaptations of 
international marketing strategy: Necessary conditions for the advancement of 
knowledge’ (2003) 20 International Marketing Review 588; Marios Theodosiou and 
Leonidas C Leonidou, Standardization versus adaptation of international marketing 
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each countries, products tailor-made for that country. In comparative law, 
adaptation seems most analogous to calls for making legal transplants fit the 
respective local context. But whereas such adaptation is often viewed as the only 
possible strategy for legal transplants, in international marketing, a different 
strategy has proven popular, too. That strategy is standardization. Here, the idea is 
to establish a worldwide standard that can be used for every country. The great 
advantage of standardization lies mainly in cost efficiency: research and 
development costs are reduced (because fewer products need to be developed); 
large numbers of its product for worldwide markets enable economies of scale; 
global marketing strategies enhance the value of the brand. This approach is 
analogous to universalism in comparative law.39 Notably, because the standard is 
not, ideally, drawn from one background but instead incorporates worldwide 
differences, such a strategy can be successful, too 
Ikea’s global strategy is clearly one of standardization.40 Ikea’s official business idea 
is “to offer a wide range of well-designed, functional home furnishing products at 
prices so low that as many people as possible will be able to afford them.”41. Billy, 
the famous bookshelf, has been sold at least 41 million times worldwide.42 Ikea 
products fit in a vast variety of places. And we find the same products, by and large, 
in Sweden, the United States, and Hong Kong—an extreme standardization of 
products. Although Ikea does offer slightly different products in different countries, 
the  layout of its stores is the same everywhere, and many of its most successful 
                                                                                                                                                                     
strategy: An integrative assessment of the empirical research’ (2003) 13 
International Business Review 141–171. 
39 Mark Tushnet, Some reflections on method in comparative constitutional law, in 
Sujit Choudhry (ed.), The migration of constitutional ideas (Cambridge University 
Press 2006) 67, 69-72; cf. Ran Hirshl, On the blurred methodological matrix of 
comparative constitutional law, id. at 39, 43-46 (“concept formation through 
multiple description”); Günter Frankenberg, Stranger than  aradise: Identity and 
Politics in Comparative Law, 1997 Utah L Rev 259, 264-5. 
40 This has been established in several Swedish university theses; see, e.g., Damien 
Badier &  Carole Rousset, Strategies Adopted in the International Market—The Case 
of IKEA in France (Bachelor Thesis, University of Skövde, 2007); David Eskander & 
Mohamed Kotaiba Abdul Aal, Does IKEA Culture Apply Abroad? A Study of IKEA in 
Saudi Arabia (Master’s Thesis, Karlstad University, 2010); Sofiya Gilyazova and 
Alina Gogunova, IKEA and Volvo marketing strategies in the Italian market 
( o nko ping International Business School, Spring 2012). Standardization is not 
absolute; IKEA also adapts to local circumstances: Ulf Johansson & Åsa Thelander, ‘A 
standardised approach to the world? IKEA in China’ (2009) 1 International Journal 
of Quality and Service Sciences 199. 
41 http://inter.ikea.com/en/about-us/purpose. 
42  Billy, the world’s most versatile bookcase turns 30! (2009), 
http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_CA/img/pdf/Billy_Anniv_en.pdf,  2, 7. 
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products can be bought anywhere in the world. Such standardization extends even 
to standards of quality, efficiency, and socially responsible behavior43—in a sense, 
Ikea comes with its own Ikea law. IKEA’s “one size fits all,” is not accidental; it 
follows a deliberate company strategy. 
This global success is made possible by a second element: the quality and style of 
Ikea products. Ikea products are relatively durable. Moreover, they are not 
completely without style. In its early days, Ikea sold what we foreigners took to be 
Swedish design. Later, Ikea adopted—aped, one may say—other styles, became 
more minimalist in its design, and indeed often looked like a cheap copy of “real” 
design.  
Today, one can well speak of a distinct Ikea style. Of course, this is a strange style, 
reminiscent of the bizarre imaginary buildings on Euro notes—a style that suggests 
a number of local references but remains strangely ephemeral, placeless, global. It is, 
in Frankenberg’s words, decontextualized. But it would not be successful if it were 
genuinely decontextualized. By contrast, a large part of IKEA; success derives from 
its presentation as genuinely Swedish44—it uses the national colors, Swedish names 
for its products, Swedish dishes in its cafeterias. This Swedishness may be an 
idealization—“ bereft of its local, theoretical, and doctrinal elaborations and 
controversies”. We now know that some of the genuinely Swedish furniture was 
actually produced by political prisoners in East Germany.45 But in the end, this 
matters little to consumers. 
The same seems to be true for legal transplants. A globalized rule may, in substance, 
be stripped from any link to the national context from which it once emerged. But it 
will not be successful unless it appears to be “from somewhere” – the Torrens 
system of land registration from Australia (though it may in reality emerge from 
Hamburg) 46. 
                                                        
43 Suzanne Konzelmann, Frank Wilkinson, Charles Craypo and Rabih Aridi, ‘The 
Export of National Varieties of Capitalism: The Cases of Wal-Mart and IKEA’ in  
Varieties Of Capitalism And New Institutional Deals: Regulation, Welfare and the New 
Economy (Wolfram Elsner, Hardy Hanappi eds, Edward Elgar, 2008) 123. 
44 http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_US/about_ikea/the_ikea_way/swedish_heritage. 
45 ‘Ikea Admits Forced Labor Was Used in 1980s’ New York Times, Nov 18, 2012; 
see also ‘Ikea—Die Legende vom ehrlichen Möbelhaus’ Der Spiegel, Issue 51, Dec 17, 
2012.  
46 Antonio Esposito, ‘Ulrich Hübbe’s Role in the Creation of the ‘Torrens’ System of 
Land Registration in South Australia’ (2003) 24 Adelaid Law Review 263; id., ‘A 
Comparison of the Australian (“Torrens”) System of Land Registration of 1858 and 
the Law of Hamburg in the 1850s’ (2003) 7 Australian Journal of Legal History 193; 
Horst Lücke, 'Ulrich Hübbe and the Torrens System: Hübbe's German background, 
his life in Australia and his contribution to the creation of the Torrens system' 
(2009) 30 Adelaide Law Review 213; for critique of the thesis, see also Greg Taylor, 
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b) “Best Solutions” and “Good enough solutions” 
Such standardization will, of course, never create optimal furniture. Ikea products 
will never represent the same quality as high-prize furniture. Nor will they ever fit 
their surroundings as well as tailor-made furniture pieces would. What makes them 
so successful in the world are two addituonal characteristics that play a role for law 
reform as well: their price is low, and customers can assemble them on their own. 
Now, in law reform, price is rarely considered: we care about quality and disregard, 
more often than not, what such law reform costs and how easily it is implemented.47 
But of course law reform is not costless. Good tailor-made law reform requires great 
expertise of the specific societal and institutional conditions for which a law is made. 
Obviously, where such expertise is available, tailor-made law reform can be 
successful. Often, however, sufficient expertise is lacking in the recipient country of 
law reform, and law reformers from the first world cannot substitute for it. 
Undoubtedly, the first world law reformer with insufficient interest in the recipient 
country will not bring about good reforms; he will try to replicate his home law, and 
fail. But the context-sensitive law reformer will often fail as well, realizing, at the 
same time, the need to go native and her ability to do so.48 
It may seem crude to present the problems of interculturality and transplants in 
mere economic terms as costs. But ultimately, this is one way in which they 
materialize. First world law reformers would undoubtedly provide better service if 
they were schooled in the culture and law of the recipient country for several years. 
Law reformers in the recipient country would benefit from multi-year 
interdisciplinary studies in comparative law. Law reform would be easier if lawyers 
in recipient countries were paid higher salaries and had access to more legal 
materials. But in the end, the costs for all of this would be prohibitive—or, at least, 
law reform institutions are not willing to provide for them.  
And it may also be idealistic to ask that all these resources be spent to create a 
perfect law, when in reality the resources are not available. IKEA may be 
ultracapitalist, but its project to offer furniture that is both functional and affordable 
has progressive roots in the Bauhaus and its effort to bring quality not just to the 
few rich but to the masses. If we want to achieve the same for law reform, then we 
may want to learn from the Bauhaus and from IKEA that perfect law reform, in the 
sense of providing a perfect fit, may not be what is necessary. To take an example 
from current work of the World Bank,49 it may not be clear how the regulation of 
access to electricity for small businesses should be handled. Under some 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Is the Torrens System German?, (2008) 29 Journal of Legal History 253; id., ‘The 
Torrens System—Definitely not German’ (2010) 30(2) Adelaide Law Review 195. 
47 See also Michaels, Public Market (above n ___). 
48 Frankenberg, supra n. ___, 266-70. 
49 IFC/World Bank, Getting Electricty: A Pilot Study by the Doing Business Project 
(2010). 
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circumstances, a one-stop-shop solution, in which only one comprehensive 
application is handed to one authority that then is responsible for dealing with all 
other relevant authorities may be preferable. Under other circumstances, it may be 
preferable for the applicant to be in charge of dealing with several relevant 
authorities individually. It seems clear, however, that a situation in which applicants 
have to deal with twenty-seven authorities and need an average 233 days to be 
connected is deficient. In such a situation, it may not make much sense to wait until 
a perfect, tailor-made legal solution is established. It may be more helpful to develop 
a “best practice”—an IKEA-like cheap solution that fits, relatively well, most 
contexts—that provides a solution that is not a “best solution” but that is “good 
enough.” 
c) The Adaptability of Formal Solutions 
Something more is relevant. As a matter of fact, the thought that laws must 
necessarily be tailor-made for the societies in which they should perform, is 
somewhat unrealistic. It rests on an ultimately romantic idea of a perfect fit between 
law and society.50 But just as people have, since time immemorial, imported their 
furniture from foreign countries and then put to use in their homes, so legal 
transplants can come from afar and be put to new use in a new home. Laws cannot 
meaningfully be reduced to propositional statements, that much is true. At the same 
time, the fact that laws come in the form of words  means that they can remain a 
constant source of reference that enables alterations in meaning.51 
And sometimes laws that are more formal, less rich in intrinsic meaning, less 
“odd”,52 are actually to be preferred—not just because they travel more easily, but 
also because they are more open to changes in meaning within one society. It is true, 
as critics of transplants have pointed out, that legal rules will often acquire a 
different meaning in the recipient country than they do in the donor country. An 
attempt to replicate the meaning and effects from the donor country in the recipient 
country is thus doomed to fail. But it seems to me that especially those who insist on 
the context-sensitivity of legal rules should then praise such legal rules that can 
acquire different meaning in different contexts. If we find the same Ikea shelves and 
tables in student apartments, designer lofts, coffee bars, and entrance lounges, this 
suggests their flexibility, their ability to function differently in different contexts.  
                                                        
50 Thus the friendly critique by James Q. Whitman, ‘The Neo-Romantic Turn’ in 
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions 312 (Pierre Legrand & 
Roderick Munday eds., CUP, 2003). 
51 Cf, in a different context, H Jefferson  owell, ‘ archment Matters: A Meditation on 
the Constitution as Text’ (1985) 71 Iowa Law Review 1427.  
52 Cf. Frankenberg, supra n ___, 572-4. 
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And then, of course, even Ikea furniture need not necessarily remain the same. One 
new emergent trend is Ikea hacking.53 People take Ikea furniture and assemble it 
differently from the producer’s intention. And then they share their new 
constructions on the internet and can thus inspire other users.54 Such creative re-
use may not be favored by IKEA—just as the creative re-use of legal rules in a 
recipient country may not be what the donor country intended. But it may well 
serve the needs in the recipient country. 
V. Ikea Revisited 2: Taking Globalization Seriously  
So far, I have assumed that legal rules travel from one legal system to another. This 
leaves out what Frankenberg calls the global constitution—the global reservoir 
from which solutions can be dispatched to very different contexts. It is a main 
achievement of his theory to account for globalization, since any theory of legal 
transplants that ignores globalization must remain deficient.  
a) Global Product Lines 
A first aspect is not strictly one of globalization but can most fruitfully be discussed 
here. One further element that guarantees Ikea’s success is that it offers matching 
pieces. Ikea furniture may not match its new surroundings perfectly, but in return it 
will match other pieces from Ikea. Ikea pieces are not just individual; they are parts 
of whole series. The purchaser of a chair from a series knows that he can buy also a 
table and a shelf from Ikea that will match the chair.  
The same is true in law reform. Take, for example, law reform for OHADA, the 
organization of French-speaking countries in Africa.55 Here, a new, and Western-
inspired contract code may not immediately match African peculiarities (though 
contract law has proven remarkably adaptabe to local circumstances). But it 
matches other law reform projects, also inspired by Western laws: corporate codes, 
bankruptcy codes, etc. It is not clear, a priori, which match is more important. 
This has at least two consequences. For the global reservoir of legal rules, it means 
that its rules do not stand in isolation from each other. Rather, the global reservoir 
becomes attractive as a package solution. And for the legal system, it results in what 
                                                        
53 Daniela Rosner &  onathan Bean, ‘Learning from IKEA Hacking: ‘Iʼm Not One to 
Decoupage a Tabletop and Call It a Day.’, CHI '09 Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
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is sometimes called bricolage:56 an amalgam of legal rules, often from different 
contexts, fitting sometimes the local context, sometimes the global reservoir of legal 
rules. A romantic understanding of legal systems as coherent would need to be 
terrified but such a result. But arguably, bricolage represents quite weill the 
situation of postmodern law. Legal systems display internal inconsistencies not just 
as a consequence of globalization and legal transplants but also of conflicting 
internal rationalities. Legal transplants are thus not only a cause of internal 
fragmentation, they are also in accordance with such fragmentation as a typical 
feature of current law. 
b) Transformation 
This is not all. Ali Yakhlef, a scholar teaching in Sweden, has suggested—using Ikea 
as his example—that adaptation and standardization are not the only alternatives of 
international strategy.57 In fact, both adaptation and standardization suffer from the 
same shortcoming: they assume that local contexts are a given that global 
companies have to accept as it is. (We see a similar shortcoming in comparative law, 
where legal culture is often viewed as static and immune to change.)58 In reality, 
however, global companies do change local circumstances, and they often do so 
quite deliberately. In China, consumers are not used to assembling their furniture 
themselves. Yet rather than give up its cost-efficient do-it-yourself approach, Ikea is 
teaching the Chinese how to assemble their furniture. Thus, instead of adapting the 
product (and its assembly) to the context, Ikea is adapting—transforming—the 
context to its product.59 
Yakhlef suggest that it is therefore necessary to add a third strategy, that of 
transformation. This may be novel for global marketing, but it is well known in the 
context of legal transplants. After all, transformation is an explicit goal of law reform. 
Where Western institutions support law reform, they invariably do so in the hope of 
changing society: they want to secularize and democratize it; they want to increase 
the protection of human rights or the rule of law; they want to bring about economic 
prosperity. If transplants alter legal cultures, this is often desired. 
Of course, such transformation is problematic, both empirically and normatively. 
Empirically, transformation through law reform was largely unsuccessful in the first 
                                                        
56 Mark Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law (1999) 108 
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wave of law and development; whether the current wave can be more successful 
remains to be seen.60  Normatively, such transformation smacks of Western 
hegemonialism and parochialism: Either Westerners know better what is right for 
developing countries, or, worse, they try to transform those countries for their own 
benefit.61 
However, such a story may again be too bleak. Or, rather, it may be apt for the 
instrumentalist but not for the formalist concept of legal transplants. Formal legal 
rules may occasionally transform societies in ways that we find quite desirable. Or, 
put more appropriately, they may provide societies with instruments that help them 
to transform themselves. Rather than impose new and foreign concepts on a society, 
such law reform may provide the powerless with new tools to challenge those in 
power. Thus, Sally Merry reports how women in India use human rights in what has 
effectively become a fragmented legal system in order to tap into a discourse that 
strengthens their position—often without even a clear idea of what human rights 
actually are.62 
c) Globalization 
The insight that transplants enable recipients of legal rules to tap into a global 
discourse leads to a last aspect of globalization. If Ikea transforms Chinese culture 
by teaching the Chinese to assemble their own furniture, it thereby also helps make 
Chinese culture less genuinely Chinese (if such genuinity were ever possible in the 
first place) and more global. What Ikea creates, through standardization and 
transformation, is a global IKEA culture. 
The same seems to be true in law reform. Frankenberg, in developing his IKEA 
theory, explicitly ignores, “if only for the time being” the idea of a global constitution 
as an actual body of legal rules;63 in his presentation the global constitution is a 
mere reservoir that feeds the “real” legal systems. In the end, even on his own turns, 
this seems insufficiently informed by globalization. The idea of legal transplants 
between legal systems A and B, whether direct or mediated through a a global 
constitution, still suggests that legal systems A and B remain distinct entities. In 
reality, they no longer are (if they ever were). Even in developed countries, 
constitutions  
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The global character of the “reservoir of rules” that Frankenberg describes as his 
stage 3 is thus mirrored by the global character of the emerging world of national 
constitions. The uniformity offered by the warehouse bot presupposes and results in, 
unsurprisingly, a uniformity of emerging constitutional texts. Frankenberg is correct 
to point out that this uniformity is only superficial—below the propositional level, 
meanings of seemingly similar legal rules and concepts can differ dramatically from 
one context to the next. But he seems to assume that these differences exist, largely, 
between, not within national legal systems. In reality, however, it seems that the 
uniformity of the propositional level has helped spur a truly global discussion on 
legal concepts, and that as a consequence, similarities of meaning exist no longer 
predominantly within national legal systems, but often also transcend such contexts. 
Whether Constitutions could remain separate if their texts looked very different is 
an open question. But once their texts look similar, increased interaction among 
them appears almost inevitable. The global constitution is no longer just a reservoir 
or a supermarket; it is also an emerging network of local constitiutions and actors. 
We may, of course, oppose globalization, including legal globalization, because we 
believe that it facilitates the exploitation of developing countries. By installing laws 
in these countries that are made more for Western investors than for indigenous 
needs, we prioritize the interests of global commerce over those of indigenous 
culture.  ierre Legrand’s critique of legal transplant undoubtedly has such a 
culturalist and anticapitalist bent. But we should be aware that such attempts to 
protect local cultures can also be paternalistic and thus, in an ironic way, 
hegemonialist as well. Developing countries depend on investment, and it seems 
questionable whether we even can, let alone should, try to isolate them from 
globalization and thereby from investors. 
VI.Conclusion 
Let there be no doubt—the IKEA theory, just like its inspiratio in, the furniture 
producer, is both an emanation and an accelerator of global capitalism. Legal 
transplants in the IKEA theory mode not only increase global flows of legal rules; 
they also help turn laws into commodities. One may therefore argue that they 
support everything that we fear about globalization: They threaten to help exploit 
developing countries. They are often as lopsided as the legal systems in the 
developed countries from which they are borrowed, focusing on he liberalization of 
markets rather than social welfare, on negative rights rather than positive rights 
and access, on overall economic efficiency rather than substantive equality and 
justice. 
Regardless of one’s normative position, however, it seems necessary for 
understanding, let alone critique, to have an adequate understanding of the 
processes of legal transplantation. Analytically, the IKEA theory seems to me to be to 
provide a very helpful structure for analyzing legal transplant processes. The theory 
is superior to other models because it focuses not just on the transplant from one 
system to another, but also includes de- and recontextualization. It is superior also 
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because, by introducing a global level, it transcends the mere horizontal relation 
between legal systems and thus makes it possible to properly conceptualize the 
current “one size fits all” revival in comparative law. If the theory has one 
descriptive deficiency, then maybe that it does not take the globality of current law 
sufficiently seriously, that it still insists too much, for conceptual anaysis, on treating 
national legal systems as distinct. 
As concerns our critique of current practice of legal transplants, however, I think we 
must be weary not to misunderstand the phenomenon we deal with. There exists, of 
course, a naïve instrumentalism or functionalism in law reform that deserves 
criticism. However, what emerges from the IKEA theory as a much more powerful 
agent of global legal change is not functionalism but formalism. Rules that are tied to 
one legal function will be ineffective in societies with different functional needs; 
their transplant is often a waste of time and resources, but not much more. The truly 
powerful rules are such formal rules that, precisely because they carry so little 
inherent meaning, can become active in very different legal systems—and, at the 
same time, link different legal systems to each other. 
What we are observing,  under conditions of globalization, is a move towards more 
formal, less context-specific legal rules. This new formalism is not a neoliberal 
strategy or ideology; it is a consequence of a globalizing world, in which the creation 
of meaning and context is no longer a national affair, and in which a fragmented 
society makes rules with fixed and unitart meaning impossible—on any level , 
whether global, national, or local. In the face of this, insisting on culture-specificity 
and locality of legal rules, as we comparative lawyers are used to doing, may be both 
romantic and elitist. It may be romantic because it overestimates local cultures—
their localness, their persistence, their desirability. And it may be elitist because it 
suggests that only best law solutions are good enough. If we comparative lawyers 
want to be relevant, we must take the return to form and standardization seriously. 
And we may, grudgingly, have to admit that Alan Watson is not, in the end, as 
uninteresting as we make him to be. 
